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Criminal Mind or Inculpable 
Adolescence?   
A Glimpse at the History, Failures, 
and Required Changes of the 
American Juvenile Correction 
System 
 
Christopher J. Menihan* ** 
 
In 1987, thirteen-year-old Craig Price crept out of his 
parents’ house in Warwick, Rhode Island, into the night, and 
through the back door of Becky Spencer’s home two houses 
away.1  Price found the twenty-seven-year-old single mother 
asleep on her living room floor.  He also found a ten-inch kitchen 
knife.2  “A strange sense of awareness settled upon me,” Price 
later explained, “and with this awareness came this raw and 
savage sense of outrage that completely consumed me. It was 
time (to) kill.”3  Price stabbed Spencer with ferocity, nearly 
burying the ten-inch blade.4  Fifty-eight thrusts later, when 
Spencer finally stopped moving, when he knew she was dead, 
Price subsided.5  The knife had punctured Spencer’s heart, lungs 
and liver, and also penetrated her face and head.6  Spencer’s 
 
* Christopher J. Menihan is a 2015 Juris Doctor Candidate at Pace University 
School of Law.  He graduated summa cum laude from the University of Rhode 
Island in 2012 with a Bachelors of Arts in English, participated in Pace Law 
School’s Federal Judicial Honors Program, and is a Senior Editor of PACE LAW 
REVIEW. 
** I would like to thank my Mother, my Father, Courtney, Cydney and Dan, 
without whose unconditional support this Comment would never have been 
written. 
1. Mark Arsenault, ‘Into Another World’—Craig Price’s Story, THE 
PROVIDENCE J., Mar. 7, 2004, at A-01 [hereinafter Into Another World]. 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. Mark Arsenault, ‘This Dark Deed’—Craig Price’s Story, THE 
1
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murder went unsolved, and Price was smug: “I truly felt like 
getting away with it was my fate and destiny.  I really felt clever 
and supreme.  I acted just like everybody else who thought a 
killer walked their neighborhood streets.”7 
Two years later in 1989, fifteen-year-old Price murdered 
again.8  This time, however, his crime was exponentially more 
brutal.   Price again crept surreptitiously from his parents’ house 
and through the neighborhood, this time towards Joan Heaton’s 
home one street away.9  Price cut the window screen with a steak 
knife he was carrying.10  Thirty-nine-year-old Heaton’s body 
exhibited eleven stab wounds to the chest, face and neck, rib and 
skull fractures, and numerous injuries from blunt trauma.11  The 
body of her daughter, fifth-grader Mellissa Heaton, displayed 
seven stab wounds and evidence of having been similarly 
beaten.12  Jennifer Heaton, two years younger than her sister 
Melissa, was also found dead.  She had been stabbed sixty-two 
times and her skull had been fractured.13 
Price suffered a heightened perception of the prejudices that 
others projected towards his African-American heritage.14  
Shortly before Spencer’s murder, Price and some friends had 
been playing manhunt in the neighborhood.15  The killer recalls 
a man bellowing racial epithets from Spencer’s property, which 
weighed on Price so acutely that it culminated in “the strongest 
desire to murder.”16  Two weeks before murdering them, Price 
met Heaton and her daughters for the first time.17  As he walked 
through their Warwick neighborhood, Price noticed the family 
out for a bike ride.18  He offered to fix a chain that had slipped 
 
PROVIDENCE J., Mar. 8, 2004, at A-01 [hereinafter This Dark Deed]. 
7. Id. 
8. This Dark Deed, supra note 6. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. 
11. Into Another World, supra note 1. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. This Dark Deed, supra note 6. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/7
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off one of the girls’ bikes.19  As he fixed the chain, Price sensed 
an aura of racial bigotry emanating from Heaton, and 
interpreted the girls’ giggling as similarly rooted in the same 
perceived racism.20  A few days later, Price claims to have 
noticed Heaton eyeing him from her window as he was walking 
home.21  What Price perceived as Heaton’s contemptuous racism 
spun him into “an absolute dark rage.”22  Then, “a solution came 
to him. Kill her. . . .  I knew the act of killing Joan Heaton was 
the answer.”23 
Found at the Heaton residence were a bloody handprint, 
blood stains in areas away from the bodies, and band-aid 
wrappers on the floor.24  Investigators deduced that the killer 
had been cut during scuffles that undoubtedly accompanied the 
murders.25  Warwick police officers and FBI agents began 
investigating the Heaton murders, keeping their eyes open for 
suspects with lacerations to the hand.26  While patrolling 
Metropolitan Drive in Warwick, two police officers observed a 
group of teenagers walking down the street.27  Price was among 
them.28  The officers stopped the teens and one of them noticed 
gauze on Price’s finger.29  Price maintained that he had cut his 
finger while breaking into a car, but there was no police report 
to corroborate his story.30  Price was subjected to and failed a 
polygraph test, and a search of a tool shed in his parents’ yard 
uncovered the weapons used to murder Spencer and the 
Heatons.31 
Price’s case was adjudicated in Rhode Island Family Court, 
where he was found guilty of two counts of burglary and four 
 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
3
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counts of murder.32  The court ordered the fifteen-year-old 
quadruple murderer—who would later become known as “The 
Warwick Slasher”—to be held at the Rhode Island Training 
School until he reached age twenty-one, a sentence of less than 
six years.33  The Family Court judge’s hands were tied: 
“Pursuant to the statutes then in effect. . .[t]his was the 
maximum penalty that the Family Court could impose.”34 
 
*** 
 
I. Introduction 
 
This Comment provides an historical analysis of the 
principles, understandings and laws that have formed and 
altered the American juvenile correction system.35  Part I offers 
an historical synopsis of the societal understanding that juvenile 
offenders are less culpable than their adult counterparts and 
explains the process by which this concept came to permeate 
early American common law.  By discussing the early 
nineteenth-century juvenile correction reformation movement 
and the cases that followed, Part I also illustrates the 
development and early failures of the American juvenile 
correction system.  Part II explains the history of juvenile waiver 
laws, from their early presence in the American juvenile 
correction system to their stringent nationwide alteration 
during the 1980s and 90s.  In Part III, this Comment discusses 
the unconstitutional results of increased juvenile waiver 
legislation and examines the United States Supreme Court’s 
judicial correction of such effects.  Part IV concludes that despite 
the roadblocks to effectuating necessary changes within the 
juvenile correction system, the interaction among various 
omnipresent and undeniable forces requires that the States and 
their judiciaries do so. 
 
32. See State v. Price, 820 A.2d 956, 959 (R.I. 2003). 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. This Comment uses “correction system,” “correctional officer” and 
other like terms for their colloquial value only, and does not intend to suggest 
that such entities live up to their titles, titles which imply that such entities 
partake in the active correction of criminals. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/7
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II. History, Development, and Early Failures of the American 
Juvenile Correction System 
 
A. Historical Treatment of Juvenile Malefactors 
 
The understanding that juvenile offenders deserve different 
penal treatment than their adult counterparts has been 
recognized since the jurisprudence of antiquity.  Early Muslim 
law disallowed capital punishment of offenders under the age of 
seventeen and required more merciful penalties for all 
children.36  Early Jewish law also recognized “conditions under 
which immaturity was to be considered in imposing 
punishment.”37  Then came early Roman civil law, which 
differentiated juveniles from adults by observing an “age of 
responsibility.”38  By the fifth century, Roman law had developed 
a tender-years doctrine that exempted all children under seven 
from criminal liability.39  Children that had reached puberty 
were viewed differently, however, as this developmental 
milestone—age fourteen for boys, twelve for girls—established a 
presupposition that pubescent “youth were assumed to know the 
difference between right and wrong. . . .”40  These Roman civil 
law principles later permeated eleventh- and twelfth-century 
Anglo-Saxon common law, eventually making their way into 
English common law.41 
In the late eighteenth century, English common law, in 
determining the appropriate punishment of juvenile offenders, 
considered the age at which children were capable of 
conceptualizing the nefariousness of their acts.42  Considered 
“infants,” children younger than seven were not held liable for 
 
36. RICHARD LAWRENCE & MARIO HESSE, JUVENILE JUSTICE: THE 
ESSENTIALS 12 (Jerry Westby et al. eds., 2010). 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. AM. BAR ASS’N DIV. FOR PUB. EDUC., THE HISTORY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 
PART 1, at 4 [hereinafter THE HISTORY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE PART 1], available 
at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/publiced/features/ 
DYJpart1.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited May 21, 2015). 
41. LAWRENCE & HESSE, supra note 36, at 12. 
42. Id. (“Blackstone and his contemporaries drew the line between ‘infant’ 
and ‘adult’ at the point where one could understood [sic] one’s actions.”). 
5
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committing felonies.43  Children over age fourteen were 
considered “adults” and as such were susceptible to unrestricted 
criminal punishment,44 yet children much younger could 
potentially face the harshest penalties: 
 
Between the ages of seven and fourteen was a 
gray zone. A child in this age range would be 
presumed incapable of crime. If, however, it 
appeared that the child understood the difference 
between right and wrong, the child could be 
convicted and suffer the full consequences of the 
crime. These consequences could include death in 
a capital crime.45 
 
The understanding that juvenile wrongdoers are less 
culpable than their adult counterparts then made its way to the 
Americas.46  As English common law formed the basis of United 
States common law, the former’s practices regarding the 
treatment of juvenile offenders, as well as the associated “gray 
zone[s,]” took root in the United States.47 
 
B. Development and Early Failures of the American Juvenile 
Correction System 
 
At the time of America’s independence, all criminal offenses 
committed by juveniles in the United States were adjudicated in 
adult criminal courts.48  By the time the Bill of Rights was 
adopted in 1789, United States common law had established a 
 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. THE HISTORY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE PART 1, supra note 40, at 4. 
47. Id. (“Early in United States history, the law was heavily influenced by 
the common law of England, which governed the American colonies. One of the 
most important English lawyers of the time was William Blackstone. 
Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England, first published in the late 
1760s, were widely read and admired by our nation’s founders.”). 
48. Leslie Patrice Wallace, “And I Don’t Know Why It Is That You Threw 
Your Life Away”: Abolishing Life Without Parole, the Supreme Court In 
Graham v. Florida Now Requires States to Give Juveniles Hope For a Second 
Chance, 20 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 35, 40 (2010). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/7
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rebuttable presumption that children under fourteen lacked 
“capacity” to commit capital offenses.49  “By the nineteenth 
century, many child welfare advocates reformed the country’s 
view of children. . . .”50  With goals of rehabilitating young 
malefactors and safeguarding them from the inherent dangers 
of incarceration in adult correctional institutions, “[s]ocial 
reformers began to create special facilities for troubled juveniles. 
. . .”51  In 1825, the New York House of Refuge was built to 
accommodate juvenile criminals.52  A similar facility, the 
Chicago Reform School, opened in Illinois in 1855.53  In 1899, 
Cook County, Illinois established the United States’ first 
juvenile court.54  “The idea quickly caught on, and within 
twenty-five years, most states had set up juvenile court 
systems.”55  Like the juvenile correctional facilities, the principal 
objective of early juvenile courts was to rehabilitate young 
wrongdoers, hoping to deter them from continuing lives of 
crime.56 
By the mid-twentieth century, flaws in the juvenile court 
system had come to light.  In 1959, after an attempted purse-
snatching and a number of home break-ins, fourteen-year-old 
Morris Kent, Jr. was placed on probation by the District of 
Columbia Juvenile Court.57  Two years later, while still on 
probation, Kent entered a woman’s apartment, raped her, and 
stole her wallet.58  After being caught, Kent volunteered 
information regarding additional crimes he had committed, 
which left him facing eight criminal charges—“two instances of 
housebreaking, robbery, and rape, and one of housebreaking and 
robbery.”59  On these facts, it is more than evident that the 
District of Columbia Juvenile Court system had not performed 
 
49. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 361-62 (1989). 
50. Wallace, supra note 48, at 40. 
51. THE HISTORY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE PART 1, supra note 40, at 5. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. (“[T]he ultimate goal was to guide a juvenile offender toward life 
as a responsible, law-abiding adult.”). 
57. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 543 (1966). 
58. Id. 
59. Id. at 549. 
7
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its principal role of rehabilitating Kent, of deterring him from a 
continued life of crime, of “guid[ing] [this] juvenile offender 
toward life as a responsible, law-abiding adult.”60  Following his 
initial arrest at age fourteen, the juvenile court’s oversight of 
Kent during his probationary period consisted of releasing him 
to his mother’s custody and interviewing him “from time to time. 
. . .”61  Under the less than watchful eye of the District of 
Columbia Juvenile Court, Kent had not only continued robbing 
and breaking-and-entering, but had also become a repeated 
rapist. 
Yet Kent’s behavior alone does not fully elucidate the 
juvenile court system’s failures.  His case had been transferred 
to adult criminal court and ultimately made its way to the 
United States Supreme Court.62  Supreme Court Justice Fortas 
noted, “There is much evidence that some juvenile courts, 
including that of the District of Columbia, lack the personnel, 
facilities and techniques to perform adequately as 
representatives of the State. . .at least with respect to children 
charged with law violation.”63  Justice Fortas also explained that 
since juvenile courts adjudicate juvenile crime on “the premise 
that the proceedings are ‘civil’ in nature. . .[,]” juvenile offenders 
are often not afforded the same rights as criminal defendants in 
adult court, sometimes being deprived of prerogatives such as 
“entitle[ment] to bail; to indictment by grand jury; to a speedy 
and public trial; to trial by jury; to immunity against self-
incrimination; to confrontation of his accusers; and in some 
jurisdictions. . .entitle[ment] to counsel.”64  Justice Fortas 
concluded that the failure of the juvenile court system to achieve 
 
60. THE HISTORY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE PART 1, supra note 40, at 5. 
61. Kent, 383 U.S. at 543. 
62. Id. at 541. (The Supreme Court in Kent quoted “[t]he provision of the 
Juvenile Court Act governing waiver…‘If a child sixteen years of age or older 
is charged with an offense which would amount to a felony in the case of an 
adult, or any child charged with an offense which if committed by an adult is 
punishable by death or life imprisonment, the judge may, after full 
investigation, waive jurisdiction and order such child held for trial under the 
regular procedure of the court which would have jurisdiction of such offense if 
committed by an adult; or such other court may exercise the powers conferred 
upon the juvenile court in this subchapter in conducting and disposing of such 
cases.’” Id. at 547-48.) See also discussion of waiver infra Part II. 
63. Kent, 383 U.S.at 555-56. 
64. Id. at 555. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/7
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its principal goal of rehabilitating young wrongdoers raised 
serious reservations as to the justifiability of depriving youths of 
such momentous rights65: “There is evidence, in fact, that there 
may be grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of 
both worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to 
adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment 
postulated for children.”66 
Justice Fortas also revealed the District of Columbia 
Juvenile Court’s failure to follow mandatory protocol in waiving 
jurisdiction over Kent.67  Kent’s counsel motioned for a hearing 
on the issue of waiver, armed with “an affidavit of a psychiatrist 
certifying that petitioner ‘is a victim of servere [sic] 
psychopathology’ and recommending hospitalization for 
psychiatric observation[,]” and prepared to argue that Kent was 
therefore a select candidate for institutional rehabilitation 
under the supervision of the Juvenile Court.68  The Juvenile 
Court judge, however, simply disregarded the motion. “The 
Juvenile Court judge did not rule on these motions. He held no 
hearing. He entered an order reciting that after ‘full 
investigation, I do hereby waive’ jurisdiction of petitioner. . . .”69  
Although the Juvenile Court had “presumably” reviewed reports 
and suggestions from the Juvenile Probation Section and the 
Juvenile Court staff, and had considered a social service file kept 
on Kent throughout his probation, the Supreme Court held that 
the Juvenile Court judge had not adhered to “the statutory 
requirement of a ‘full investigation.’”70  The Supreme Court held 
that Kent’s counsel had a right to actively take part in the 
waiver decision and that the Juvenile Court judge was not 
permitted to make such a consequential ruling “without any 
hearing or statement or reasons. . .[,]” especially when the 
defendant’s counsel had specifically motioned for a hearing on 
 
65. Id. (“While there can be no doubt of the original laudable purpose of 
juvenile courts, studies and critiques in recent years raise serious questions as 
to whether actual performance measures well enough against theoretical 
purpose to make tolerable the immunity of the process from the reach of 
constitutional guaranties applicable to adults.”). 
66. Id. at 556. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 545. 
69. Id. at 546. 
70. Id. at 553. 
9
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the issue of waiver.71 
In 1971, the Supreme Court again voiced its concern with 
the inadequacies of the juvenile court system.72  The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to appellants in McKeiver v. 
Pennsylvania to consider whether juveniles had a constitutional 
right to a jury trial in state juvenile court delinquency 
hearings.73  Appellants included Joseph McKeiver, who had been 
charged in 1968 at age sixteen with larceny, robbery and 
receiving stolen goods; juvenile Edward Terry, who in 1969 had 
been charged with conspiracy and assaulting a police officer; and 
more than forty-five African American juveniles ranging in age 
from eleven to fifteen, who had been charged with willfully 
impeding traffic while “protesting school assignments and a 
school consolidation plan.”74  McKeiver and Terry had both been 
denied jury trials by the Juvenile Branch of the Philadelphia 
Court of Common Pleas. The African-American youth had been 
denied the same by a North Carolina juvenile court.75 
Writing for the plurality, Justice Blackmun discussed the 
numerous and continuous constitutional dilemmas that the 
Supreme Court had tackled concerning the protections—or lack 
thereof—that the juvenile court systems have, since their 
inception, afforded youthful offenders.76  The plurality held that 
 
71. Id. at 553-54. (“The statute does not permit the Juvenile Court to 
determine in isolation and without the participation or any representation of 
the child the ‘critically important’ question whether a child will be deprived of 
the special protections and provisions of the Juvenile Court Act. It does not 
authorize the Juvenile Court, in total disregard of a motion for hearing filed by 
counsel, and without any hearing or statement or reasons, to decide—as in this 
case—that the child will be…transferred to jail along with adults, and that he 
will be exposed to the possibility of a death sentence instead of treatment for a 
maximum, in Kent's case, of five years, until he is 21.”). 
72. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (plurality opinion). 
73. The Court was divided on the issue: “Mr. Justice BLACKMUN, joined 
by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Mr. Justice STEWART, and Mr. Justice WHITE, 
concluded that: 1. The applicable due process standard in juvenile proceedings 
is fundamental fairness…which emphasized factfinding procedures, but in our 
legal system the jury is not a necessary component of accurate factfinding.” 
(internal citations omitted). 
74. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 534-36. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 531-34 (discussing United States Supreme Court cases, 
including In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); DeBacker v. Brainard, 396 U.S. 
28 (1969); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Kent, 383 U.S. 541; Haley v. Ohio, 
332 U.S. 596 (1948)). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/7
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“a jury trial is not constitutionally required in a juvenile court’s 
adjudicative stage. . .[d]espite disappointments, failures, and 
shortcomings in the juvenile court procedure. . . .”77  Justice 
Blackmun noted the Court’s “disturbed concern about the 
[juvenile court] judge who is untrained and less than fully 
imbued with an understanding approach to the complex 
problems of childhood and adolescence.”78  He further opined, 
“Too often the juvenile court judge falls far short of that stalwart, 
protective, and communicating figure the [juvenile court] system 
envisaged.”79  But Justice Blackmun addressed more than just 
juvenile court judges, also noting a profusion of severe flaws in 
juvenile court systems generally: 
 
The community’s unwillingness to provide people 
and facilities and to be concerned, the 
insufficiency of time devoted, the scarcity of 
professional help, the inadequacy of dispositional 
alternatives, and our general lack of knowledge all 
contribute to dissatisfaction with the [juvenile 
court] experiment.80 
 
Summing up this train of thought, Justice Blackmun wrote, “the 
fond and idealistic hopes of the juvenile court proponents and 
early reformers. . .have not been realized.”81  The Supreme 
Court’s succinct and concerned presentation of the juvenile court 
system’s many failures renders nearly irrefutable the conclusion 
that juvenile offenders did not receive the protections and 
assistance that the founders of the juvenile court system had 
deemed necessary.82  It becomes easier, too, to comprehend why 
juvenile offenders like Kent were not being properly 
rehabilitated nor deterred from continuing lives of crime.83 
 
77. Id. at 528. 
78. Id. at 534. (Justice Blackmun made clear, however, that such 
insufficiency of juvenile court judges is not always the case, expressing that 
there is “at…the same time…an appreciation for the juvenile court judge who 
is devoted, sympathetic, and conscientious….”). 
79. Id. at 544. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. See Wallace, supra note 48. 
83. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966). 
11
  
772 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol.  35:2 
III. History of Juvenile Waiver 
 
Juvenile waiver laws similar to that which landed sixteen-
year-old Morris Kent, Jr. in adult criminal court in the 1960s 
had been in effect in the United States since the earliest days of 
the juvenile court system.84  Despite widespread sentiment that 
crimes committed by juvenile offenders should be adjudicated by 
particularized juvenile courts, some of the earliest of these 
tribunals had the ability to transfer matters to adult criminal 
courts.85  Such transfers only occurred in “hard cases[,]” those 
involving the most serious crimes, and were usually exercised 
through judicial waiver, which “left transfer decisions to the 
discretion of juvenile court judges.”86 
By the mid-twentieth century, juvenile court judges in many 
states possessed the discretionary power to waive jurisdiction 
over such cases.87  By the early 1970s, nearly every states’ 
juvenile code conferred this power upon juvenile court judges.88  
“Automatic transfer laws,” which mandated judicial waiver in 
cases involving juveniles charged with crimes such as murder 
and other capital offenses, were less common, as were “exclusion 
laws,” which required that matters involving juveniles similarly 
charged bypass juvenile court entirely.89  Even more rare were 
laws granting prosecutors discretion to charge serious juvenile 
offenders in adult criminal court.90  Throughout the 1970s and 
1980s, however, there was a heavy increase in automatic 
transfer laws, as well as “prosecutor-controlled forms of transfer. 
. . .”91 
 
84. AM. BAR ASS’N DIV. FOR PUB. EDUC., THE HISTORY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 
PART 2, 10 [hereinafter THE HISTORY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE PART 2]. See also 
Patrick Griffin et al., Trying Juveniles as Adults: An Analysis of State Transfer 
Laws and Reporting, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE NAT’L REPORT SERIES BULLETIN 8 
(2011) (“Laws allowing juvenile courts to waive jurisdiction over individual 
youth, sending “hard cases” to criminal courts for adult prosecution, could be 
found in some of the earliest juvenile codes and have always been relatively 
common.”). 
85. Griffin et al., supra note 84, at 2, 9. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 8. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. (Only Georgia and Florida had such laws before 1970). 
91. Id. (“[A]utomatic and prosecutor-controlled forms of transfer 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/7
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Yet, in Rhode Island in 1989, fifteen-year-old Craig Price 
was sentenced to less than six years for two counts of burglary 
and four counts of murder.92  This seems an odd result 
considering Rhode Island has continuously allowed judicial 
waiver since 191593: “With the enactment of P.L.1915, ch. 1185 . 
. . juveniles, defined by said Act as children under the age of 16, 
were, except for murder and manslaughter, exempt from [adult] 
prosecutions.”94  The statute was amended in 1944, changing the 
definition of “juveniles” to children under eighteen.95  However, 
the 1944 amendment contained a more notable alteration, at 
least vis-à-vis situations such as Price’s.  The amendment 
granted juvenile courts jurisdiction over murder and 
manslaughter charges, but the “juvenile court was authorized . 
. . to waive its jurisdiction as to juveniles 16 or 17 years of age.”96  
At age fifteen, Price did not make the cut.  Thus, although 
Arsenault’s assertion that “Rhode Island law in 1989 did not 
permit the State to hold minors past their 21st birthday, no 
matter what their crime[]”97 is not fully accurate, the Family 
Court (successor to the Rhode Island Juvenile Court) could not 
waive jurisdiction over a fifteen-year-old quadruple murderer.98 
From the mid-1980s through the end of the 1990s, concern 
over increases in violent crimes committed by youths prompted 
an intense nationwide stiffening of juvenile waiver laws.99  
Sparked by “media focus on the rise in violent youth crime that 
began in 1987 and peaked in 1994. . .” and outcries from the 
subsequently perturbed public, “legislatures in nearly every 
state revised or rewrote their laws to lower thresholds and 
 
proliferated steadily. In the 1970s alone, five states enacted new prosecutorial 
discretion laws, and seven more states adopted some form of automatic 
transfer. By the mid-1980s, nearly all states had judicial waiver laws, 20 states 
had automatic transfer laws, and 7 states had prosecutorial discretion laws.”). 
92. See State v. Price, 820 A.2d 956, 959 (R.I. 2003). 
93. 1915 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 1185. 
94. In re McCloud, 293 A.2d 512, 515 (R.I. 1972). 
95. 1944 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 1441; see id. n.5. 
96. McCloud, 293 A.2d at 515 n.5 (explaining 1944 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 
1441). 
97. Into Another World, supra note 1, at 6 (emphasis added). 
98. Rhode Island dissolved its Juvenile Court system in 1961, vesting all 
of its powers and jurisdiction in the Family Court. See 1961 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 
73. See also McCloud, 293 A.2d at 515 n.5. 
99. Griffin et al., supra note 84, at 9. 
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broaden eligibility for transfer. . . .”100  Additionally, waiver 
decision-making power once vested in juvenile court judges was 
assigned to prosecutors, and the “individualized discretion” that 
juvenile court judges once possessed was superseded by 
“automatic and categorical mechanisms.”101  Exclusion laws, for 
example, that had previously required that juvenile murder 
cases be adjudicated in adult criminal court, were expanded to 
include a wide array of violent crimes.102 
The instant reaction of Warwick, Rhode Island residents to 
the Heaton triple murder exemplifies the terror and 
apprehensiveness that result from an increase in violent crime.  
As Arsenault explained, “The Heaton murders drove Rhode 
Island into a state of fear and paranoia. . . . Home owners nailed 
windows shut, cancelled evening walks, cuddled baseball bats in 
their sleep . . . and adopted watchdogs from the pounds.”103  
Although fervent public concern with increasing crime is 
understandable, the fortified legislation was undoubtedly 
stringent.  In fact, the Supreme Court would later rule that 
many of the results obtained by the intense increases in juvenile 
waiver legislation violated the United States Constitution. 
 
IV. Unconstitutional Effects of Increased Juvenile Waiver 
Legislation 
 
In 1986, William Thompson was convicted by jury verdict of 
first-degree murder in the District Court of Grady County, 
Oklahoma.104  Thompson, along with three co-defendants, 
received the death penalty for participating in the 1983 “brutal 
murder” of his former brother-in-law.105  The victim had been 
shot, slashed and beaten, chained to a block of concrete, and 
 
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. This Dark Deed, supra note 6, at 7 (Not surprisingly, gun sales also 
soared in Warwick: “One Warwick gun dealer sold five shotguns to…women 
the week after the killings. Another reported selling six semiautomatic 
handguns. ‘They’re scared, scared to hell,’ he said.”). 
104. See Thompson v. State, 724 P.2d 780 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986), rev’d, 
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988). 
105. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 815 (1988). 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/7
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thrown into a river.106  Thompson was fifteen at the time of the 
murder.107  Despite the gruesome details of Thompson’s crime, 
the United States Supreme Court vacated the verdict in 1988, 
holding that the “‘cruel and unusual punishments’ prohibition of 
the Eighth Amendment. . .prohibits the execution of a person 
who was under 16 years of age at the time of his or her 
offense.”108  In her concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor cast 
aspersions on the Oklahoma legislation that led to Thompson’s 
sentence: 
 
[I]n enacting a statute authorizing capital 
punishment for murder without setting any 
minimum age, and in separately providing that 
juvenile defendants may be treated as adults in 
some circumstances, the Oklahoma Legislature 
either did not realize that its actions would 
effectively render 15-year-olds death eligible or 
did not give the question the serious consideration 
that would have been reflected in the explicit 
choice of a particular minimum age.109 
 
The Thompson Court also noted the conventional concepts 
apparently disavowed by the Oklahoma Legislature.110  In the 
plurality opinion’s Eighth Amendment discussion, Justice 
Stevens alluded to many of the same principles regarding 
juvenile culpability considered significant by our societies since 
antiquity: 
 
Less culpability should attach to a crime 
committed by a juvenile. . .since inexperience, less 
education, and less intelligence make the 
teenager less able to evaluate the consequences of 
his or her conduct. . . . [H]e or she is much more 
 
106. Thompson, 724 P.2d at 781. 
107. Id. 
108. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 815; see U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive 
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted.”) 
109. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 817 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
110. See id. 
15
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apt to be motivated by mere emotion or peer 
pressure than is an adult. . . .111 
 
Justice Stevens continued, “Given this lesser culpability, as well 
as the teenager’s capacity for growth and society’s fiduciary 
obligations to its children, the retributive purpose underlying 
the death penalty is simply inapplicable to the execution of a 15-
year-old offender.”112 
Justice Stevens’ stance in Thompson, which mirrors our 
societal viewpoints since antiquity in regards to juveniles’ 
limited decision-making and judgment capabilities, is today 
supported by more than mere social understanding.113  The fields 
of physiology and psychosociology soundly explain the 
differences between adolescents and adults, which account for 
juveniles’ restricted ability to make principled judgments.114  
Samantha Schad asserts that during adolescence—ages twelve 
through seventeen—“the adolescent brain undergoes dramatic 
changes. . . . [T]he brain. . .matures.”115  During this evolutionary 
process, adolescents tend to “experience increases in reward 
seeking, which translates into vulnerability for risky 
behavior.”116  Numerous psychosocial factors—weighing more 
heavily the short-term outcomes of one’s actions than the long-
term, longing for peer acceptance, and sheer impulsivity—also 
influence adolescent decision-making, which all too commonly 
results in the commission of crimes.117  Although “an 
adolescent’s cognitive skills are fairly mature by age sixteen. . 
.[,]” Schad explains, “because adolescents are more prone to 
psychosocial immaturity, they tend to be less mature than 
adults when it comes to their judgment and decision making 
 
111. Id. at 816. 
112. Id. 
113. See id. 
114. See Samantha Schad, Adolescent Decision Making: Reduced 
Culpability in the Criminal Justice System & Recognition of Capability in 
Other Legal Contexts, 14 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 375 (2011). 
115. Id. at 377. 
116. Id. at 378. 
117. Id. at 380-81. Note Justice Stevens’ agreement in Thompson: “[A 
Juvenile] is much more apt to be motivated by mere emotion or peer pressure 
than is an adult….” Thompson, 487 U.S. at 816. 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/7
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capacity.”118  With this recent scientific explication of what has 
been widespread social understanding for millennia, the 
juvenile correction system’s return to these principles appears 
not only socially, but also naturally necessary.  And, as Justice 
Stevens declared in Thompson, the Eighth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution mandates such realignment.119 
In Graham v. Florida, the United States Supreme Court 
again addressed Eighth Amendment concerns raised by juvenile 
sentencing.120  In 2003, sixteen-year-old Terrance Graham, 
along with three other youths, attempted to rob a Florida 
restaurant.121  After entering the restaurant, Graham and one 
of his accomplices encountered the manager, whom Graham’s 
cohort struck in the head with a metal bar.122  The youths 
thereafter fled the scene without having taken any money.123  
Graham was charged with a first-degree felony, armed burglary 
 
118. Schad, supra note 114, at 381. Consider Schad’s example of “how 
cognitive capacity and psychosocial factors affect the decision making process:” 
 
Imagine that a teenager is at the mall shopping with some of 
her friends. She wants to buy a new pair of sunglasses, but 
does not have the money. One friend suggests that she steal 
the glasses. As her friends begin to leave the store, she 
impulsively puts the sunglasses in her purse. She exits the 
store and the alarm goes off. Because adolescent cognitive 
skills mature before an adolescent becomes psychosocially 
mature, this teenager had the cognitive skills to know that 
stealing is against the law. She also had the cognitive 
capacity to know that it is wrong. However, at the moment 
she puts the sunglasses in her purse, she is not thinking 
about the future consequences of her actions. She does not 
think about going to jail or appearing in front of a judge. She 
is only thinking about the immediate reward of having the 
glasses she cannot afford. She is thinking about impressing 
her friends. She is not considering five minutes from now 
when she will be sitting in a police car waiting for her parents 
to pick her up. While she may have the cognitive capacity to 
make the right decision, her judgment is impaired by the 
factors of psychosocial immaturity.  
 
Id. 
119. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 815. 
120. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
121. Id. at 53. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
17
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with assault or battery, and a second-degree felony, attempted 
armed-robbery.124  He was charged as an adult pursuant to 
Florida’s prosecutorial-discretion statute, which places in the 
prosecutor’s hands the decision of whether to charge sixteen- 
and seventeen-year-olds facing felonies as juveniles or adults.125 
Pursuant to a plea deal, Graham pleaded guilty to both 
crimes, but the trial court “withheld adjudication of guilt. . .” and 
released Graham on three years’ probation.126  Less than six 
months later, Graham, then seventeen, and two twenty-year-old 
accomplices committed a home-invasion armed-robbery.127  
Graham attempted a second robbery that same night, and was 
subsequently arrested after a high-speed chase with police.128  
During police questioning, Graham admitted to having 
committed “two to three” other robberies.129 
Upon violating probation, Graham was sentenced for the 
first- and second-degree felonies stemming from the botched 
restaurant robbery.130  The seventeen-year-old received the 
maximum penalty allowable for each charge under Florida 
law—fifteen years for attempted armed robbery and life 
imprisonment for armed burglary.131  The latter charge, 
however, is yet more relentless than it appears on its face, for, 
due to Florida’s termination of its parole system, a life sentence 
in Florida meant that Graham would indubitably serve a life 
sentence without the possibility of parole.132  The trial judge 
expressed his reasoning for imposing the harshest possible 
sentence in disregard of the Florida Department of Corrections’ 
 
124. Id. 
125. FLA. STAT. § 985.557(1)(b) (2007) (formerly—and at the time of 
Graham’s prosecution—FLA. STAT. § 985.227(1)(b) (2003)). See supra Part II 
discussion of prosecutorial discretion. 
126. Graham, 560 U.S. at 53-54. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. at 54-55. 
129. Id. at 55. (Similar to Morris Kent, Jr., Graham continued a life of 
crime while on probation.  In Kent’s situation, the failure of the juvenile 
probation system to rehabilitate and redirect young wrongdoers is apparent.  
Graham, however, was serving probation in Florida’s adult system.  Evidently, 
Florida’s adult system did an equally poor job of correcting Graham’s criminal 
behavior.).  See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966). 
130. Graham, 560 U.S. at 48. 
131. Id. at 57. 
132. See FLA. STAT. § 921.002(1)(e) (2003). 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/7
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recommendation that Graham receive a sentence of not more 
than four years, as well as the State’s recommendation that 
Graham serve thirty years for armed robbery and fifteen years 
for attempted armed burglary: 
 
[Y]ou had a judge who took the step to try and give 
you direction through his probation order to give 
you a chance to get back onto track. . . . And I don’t 
know why it is that you threw your life away. . . . 
[I]f I can’t do anything to help you, if I can’t do 
anything to get you back on the right path, then I 
have to start focusing on the community and 
trying to protect the community from your 
actions. . . . [T]hat is where we are today. . . . 
You’ve evidently decided this is the direction 
you’re going to take in life, and it’s unfortunate 
that you made that choice. I have reviewed the 
statute. I don’t see where any further juvenile 
sanctions would be appropriate. I don’t see where 
any youthful offender sanctions would be 
appropriate.133 
 
Yet the trial judge’s comments do not harmonize with the 
understanding of juvenile culpability deemed by Justice Stevens 
in Thompson to be pivotally important to the proper treatment 
of juvenile offenders under the Eighth Amendment.134  Nor do 
his words conform to scientific fact.135  To express that there is 
no hope for a juvenile offender, that he has made a conscious 
decision at age seventeen to adhere to a continued and ceaseless 
life of crime until the end of his days, is to deny the youth’s 
ability to change; it is to disregard the scientific factors that 
affect adolescent decision-making and risk analysis.136  It is also 
to disavow a social conviction that has been accepted for 
thousands of years—that adolescents, due to various forces 
acting upon and within them, are plagued by an inability to align 
 
133. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 56-57. 
134. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988). 
135. See supra notes 113-18 & accompanying text. 
136. See Schad, supra note 114. 
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themselves with rigid morality.137 
The United States Supreme Court likewise disagreed with 
the trial judge’s sentiment.138  The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to settle Graham’s contention that his sentence of life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole violated the 
Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.139  
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court, in which he 
expressed an attitude antithetical to that professed by the trial 
judge who handed down Graham’s sentence.140  The opinion 
begins with an air of intensity, as Justice Kennedy explained the 
Eighth Amendment’s import: “The Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Clause prohibits the imposition of inherently 
barbaric punishments under all circumstances. . . . [U]nder the 
Eighth Amendment, the State must respect the human 
attributes even of those who have committed serious crimes.”141  
Justice Kennedy noted that juveniles are “less deserving of the 
most severe punishments. . .” due to their “lessened culpability. 
. .[,]”142  expressing a view of juvenile culpability akin to that 
conveyed by Justice Stevens in Thompson.  In support of its 
position, the Court noted juveniles’ slighter understanding of 
responsibility, their vulnerability to peer pressure, and their 
relative immaturity.143  Further, relying on the scientific 
discourse that is the subject of Schad’s work, the Court stated 
that juvenile malefactors are indeed more likely to reform than 
their adult counterparts.144  Specifically, the Court explained, 
“developments in psychology and brain science continue to show 
fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds. For 
example, parts of the brain involved in behavior control continue 
to mature through late adolescence.”145  Justice Kennedy put it 
simply: “Juveniles are more capable of change than are adults. . 
. . ‘[I]t would be misguided to equate the failings of a minor with 
those of an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a minor’s 
 
137. Id. 
138. Graham, 560 U.S. at 48. 
139. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
140. Graham, 560 U.S. at 48. 
141. Id. at 59 (internal citations omitted). 
142. Id. at 68 (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005)). 
143. Id. at 68 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-70). 
144. Id. 
145. Id. at 68. 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/7
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character deficiencies will be reformed.’”146 
The Graham Court held that sentencing “juveniles,” which 
it defined as all convicts under the age of eighteen, who had not 
committed homicide to life imprisonment without the possibility 
of parole violates the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Clause.147  Justice Kennedy explained that 
sentencing juveniles to life imprisonment without the possibility 
of parole entails an exceptionally more merciless punishment 
than when the same sentence is handed to older convicts,148  
noting that “[a] 16-year-old and a 75-year-old each sentenced to 
life without parole receive the same punishment in name 
only.”149  The difference being that a juvenile offender will 
generally remain imprisoned for a greater portion of his or her 
life and will generally serve more years than adults likewise 
sentenced.150  The Court exempted juveniles convicted of 
homicide from its holding on the grounds that, despite their age, 
such adolescent wrongdoers exhibit greater moral culpability 
than juveniles convicted of felonies that, although serious, do not 
involve killing.151 
Terrance Graham received the cruel and unusual, 
unconstitutional sentence of life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole due to the compounding effects of multiple 
factors.  Contrary to early juvenile court practices in the United 
States, the prosecutor, rather than the juvenile court judge, 
chose to remove Graham from the juvenile forum.152  
Considering the trial judge’s exceeding departure from the well-
settled jurisprudential understanding of juvenile culpability, it 
is clear that Graham’s case was not adjudicated in a court that 
was appropriately geared to properly sentence adolescent 
 
146. Id. (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 570). 
147. Id. at 48. 
148. Id. at 71. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. at 50. 
151. Id. at 69. The Graham Court also reasoned that, “[w]ith respect to 
life without parole for juvenile non-homicide offenders, none of the goals of 
penal sanctions that have been recognized as legitimate—retribution, 
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation, provides an adequate 
justification.” Id. at 71-74. 
152. See supra Part II discussion of juvenile waiver. 
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wrongdoers.153  There was also a rather enigmatic problem at 
play, similar to the one identified by Justice O’Connor in 
Thompson, concerning the results of apparently hasty, ill-
considered legislation.154  Florida legislation at the time of 
Graham’s sentencing was amiss.  As the “[s]tate acknowledged 
at oral argument[,]. . .even a 5–year–old, theoretically, could 
receive [life without the possibility of parole] under the letter of 
the law.”155  The ridiculousness of such a statutory effect 
illustrates an unquestionable lack of “deliberate, express, and 
full legislative consideration.”156  The various forces that acted 
upon Graham and led to his unconstitutional sentence illustrate 
the collective interaction among elements within the juvenile 
correction system, which together culminate in the overall 
failure of that system. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
This Comment’s historical analysis seeks to inculcate its 
readers with an understanding that, due to an array of scientific 
factors, juvenile wrongdoers are quite often less culpable for 
their criminal acts than their adult counterparts.  The necessary 
changes to the American juvenile correction system are many.  
And with each and every necessary change, roadblocks to their 
effectuation are certain.  Monetary deficiency may be the most 
arduous difficulty that reformation of the juvenile correction 
system currently faces.  States nationwide must succeed in 
tackling this currently overarching dilemma before juvenile 
correction systems will become properly funded and staffed, and 
therefore properly equipped to address their many failures.  
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has interpreted our 
Constitution’s Eighth Amendment as requiring certain changes 
within the juvenile correction system, which the States cannot 
deny.  Societal principles, millennia-old as well as currently 
 
153. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 48. 
154. See Justice O’Connor’s criticism of the Oklahoma statute that 
allowed capital punishment of minors who were under the age of sixteen at the 
time of their offense.  Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 815 (1988) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring). 
155. Graham, 560 U.S. at 67. 
156. Id. 
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/7
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operative, and scientific support thereof also mandate necessary 
changes.  The States and their judiciaries cannot ignore the 
demands of societal mores and scientific proof any more than 
they can decline to adhere to the Supreme Court’s interpretation 
of the United States Constitution. 
 
*** 
 
After confessing in 1989 to the brutal Spencer and Heaton 
murders, the Rhode Island Family Court ordered Craig Price 
committed to the Rhode Island State Training School until 
October 11, 1994, Price’s twenty-first birthday.157  Prosecutors, 
along with the entire State of Rhode Island, considered the 
sentence abhorrently deficient.158  When Price’s public defender 
learned that prosecutors were contemplating the possibility of 
having Price committed to a mental institution, she immediately 
advised Price not to cooperate with psychiatric personnel, 
despite a court order to do so.159  In 1993, Price was charged with 
assault and extortion after allegedly threatening to “snuff out” a 
Training School correctional officer.160  “Craig Price became the 
first Training School youth in memory prosecuted for a verbal 
confrontation[.]”161  Price was found guilty by jury verdict and 
received a fifteen-year sentence, seven to serve, eight 
suspended.162  Price thereafter continued to defy repeated court 
orders to undergo psychiatric evaluation.163  Rhode Island 
Attorney General Jeffrey Pine urged the court to hold Price in 
contempt for his ongoing failure to cooperate.164  The trial court 
agreed and imposed a one-year sentence for civil contempt, 
 
157. Mark Arsenault, ‘Flame of Hope’—Craig Price’s Story, THE 
PROVIDENCE J., Mar. 9, 2004, at A-01 [hereinafter Flame of Hope]. 
158. Id. 
159. Id. See State v. Price, 820 A.2d 956, 960 (R.I. 2003) (“[H]is 
withdrawal from the diagnostic and treatment process resulted from fear 
expressed by his attorney that this psychiatric examination might lead to a 
civil commitment under the Mental Health Law, G.L.1956 chapter 5 of title 
406, that could result in his being placed into a psychiatric facility for 
commitment beyond his twenty-first birthday.”) Id. 
160. Flame of Hope, supra note 157 (internal quotations marks omitted). 
161. Id. 
162. Id. 
163. Price, 820 A.2d at 963. 
164. Id.; Flame of Hope, supra note 157. 
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which would terminate at anytime upon Price’s compliance with 
the court order.165  Price finally agreed to undergo psychiatric 
evaluation, but doctors reported that Price had lied during the 
sessions about his involvement in the Spencer and Heaton 
murders.166  The prosecution then moved to hold Price in 
criminal contempt.167  Price was found guilty by jury verdict of 
criminal contempt and sentenced to twenty-five years, ten to 
serve, fifteen suspended contingent upon good behavior.168  Price 
failed to satisfy the conditions of his suspended sentence, when 
in 1998 he “stomped on” a correctional officer, and in 2001 beat 
up another inmate.169 
Price is currently serving his twenty-five-year sentence for 
criminal contempt.  If he can manage to avoid further 
prosecution, the 300-pound Warwick Slasher who, when 
Arsenault first met with him in 2002, wore a XXXXL prison 
jumpsuit and was capable of bench-pressing 485 pounds,170 is 
scheduled for release in 2022.171 
 
 
165. Price, 820 A.2d at 963. 
166. Flame of Hope, supra note 157. 
167. Price, 820 A.2d at 963. 
168. Flame of Hope, supra note 157. 
169. Id. 
170. Into Another World, supra note 1. 
171. Flame of Hope, supra note 157. 
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